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In the European Union, external financial auditing of local 
and regional government entities is performed according to 
four distinct methods. Only six states (Germany, France, 
Spain, Austria, Poland, and the Netherlands) resort to the 
use of regional audit institution (RAI). RAIs may carry out 
this function for local governments as a whole, or selec-
tively. They control accounting regularity and management 
performance according to procedural methods that pres-
ent certain analogies in all the states that have RAIs. The 
follow-up to RAI recommendations is of unequal scope 
and depends on each state. In some states, these recom-
mendations are considered to be of imperative character, 
while in others their effect is considered to be achieved by 
the mere publication of the control report.
Keywords: external audit, financial auditing, accounts, pub-
lic finance, local government, RAI, financial management
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The member states of the European Union exercise external control of the 
accounts and financial management of their 91 000 local and regional au-
thorities in four distinct ways (Chouvel, 2017): a) a supreme audit institution 
(SAI) in twenty states (court of accounts or audit office), b) a regional ex-
ternal public finance audit institution (RAI) in half a dozen states (regional 
court or chamber of audit), c) a ministerial or decentralised administrative 
body in a dozen, and d) the private sector in a similar number of states. None 
of these are exclusive, because half of the states appeal to several of these 
institutions simultaneously, depending on the origin of the public funds in-
volved, the nature of control exercised, or the local government in question.
However, even if every state of the EU does have an SAI, not all of them 
have the same status. Some have court power (France, Italy, Portugal, 
Greece, and Spain), while others are called courts of auditors, but do not 
have court power (Germany, Austria, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). 
Others are organised as audit offices (Ireland, Malta, Finland, Slovenia, 
and Lithuania). Moreover, these SAIs either do not have the competenc-
es to control local authorities (France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Po-
land) or can only partially control them (for example, in Spain, Austria, 
the Czech Republic, and Estonia), depending on the nature of the local 
authorities or the public funds in question. 
Public bodies also exercise external control of local authorities in a dozen 
EU member states. The statutes of these bodies are varied and they may 
be constructed as: an audit committee (the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, 
Finland, and Denmark), a public institution (Germany, Belgium, and 
the Czech Republic), a ministerial administrative service (Luxembourg, 
Belgium, and Ireland), or even a local level institution (Lithuania). These 
bodies intervene alongside other types of control (SAI, RAI, the private 
sector), but generally they control the financial management of munici-
palities. Finally, the private audit sector occupies a significant place in the 
external control of the local authorities of a dozen states (Chouvel, 2016a). 
The contribution of accounting professionals may be important and may 
concern both the accounts and the financial management of local govern-
ment (United Kingdom, Sweden, and Finland), but their task is generally 
confined to the purely financial control of all or some local authorities 
(Denmark, Hungary, Germany, Malta, Latvia, Italy, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, and France).
The control exercised by the RAI is embedded in a framework where half 
of the states use several of these control methods. However, it is observed 
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that although the control bodies present great diversity, the objects of the 
control are always the accounts and/or financial management of the com-
munity. The characteristics of RAIs differ from one country to another, as 
well as from one region to another (within the same country). They may 
or may not have jurisdictional form, may hold regional or sub-regional 
competence, and may provide external control of all local and regional 
authorities that fall within the scope of their competence or ensure an 
audit for some authorities only.
The RAIs in Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Spain, France, and Aus-
tria should not be subsumed under the functional division of courts of 
auditors, which belong to the regional level. They should be seen as fully 
incorporated into the structure of the SAI and not autonomous as RAIs 
usually are. This also holds true for twenty regional divisions of the Ital-
ian Court of Auditors, two regional divisions of the Portuguese Court 
of Auditors (established in Madeira and the Azores), forty-two regional 
chambers of the Romanian Court of Accounts, ten regional offices of the 
Bulgarian Court of Auditors, twenty regional offices of the Croatian Au-
dit Office, ten regional offices of the Czech Supreme Audit Office, and 
for eight regional offices of the Slovak Supreme Audit Office.
The creation of RAIs was a response to several cumulative needs. Some 
states did not have an independent body for the external financial man-
agement control of local governments (the Netherlands and Poland), 
while the federal (Germany, Austria), or quasi-federal (Spain), structure 
of other states led to the creation of decentralised control bodies. Fi-
nally, the large number of local governments made it impossible for the 
Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) to control them all (France). This last 
factor was probably decisive, insofar as the states concerned account for 
two-thirds of the total number of local governments in the EU – France 
alone accounting for 40 percent.
The European Organization of Regional External Public Finance Audit 
Institutions (EURORAI) was created in 1992 with the aim of gathering 
together local and regional external public finance audit institutions of 
the European area, in the geopolitical sense (because it integrates Russian 
and Swiss institutions as well), or as associate members (e.g. Brazilian 
institutions). A specific task of the EURORAI is to promote studies of 
public finance audits1 and to clarify the terminology used in each country 
to enable the harmonisation of methods of control. 
1 EURORAI produces interesting monographs: see, for example, Regional Public 
Sector Audit Institutions in Europe. A Comparative Study. (2004). This study, covering ten 
60




















The presence of RAIs in more than a fifth of European Union member states 
therefore raises questions about the characteristics of this type of control 
bodies and their work. The audits carried out by RAIs in these states do not 
have a uniform material scope or procedures – although the same conclusion 
could be drawn for SAI audits or those by other bodies – even if they do share 
technical analogies. The paper attempts to answer two research questions:
RQ1: Could some common features that transcend the diversity of ad-
ministrative situations be found between RAIs in these countries? 
RQ2: Can it be concluded that beyond the common will to ensure control 
in order to optimize local financial management, these states – which 
have the largest number of municipalities – have introduced sui generis 
arrangements and thus defy all attempts to make comparisons and can 
only be studied in juxtaposition to one another? 2
The analysis of the importance of the RAI in the EU, in comparative 
law and institutions, leads first to the examination of their scope (wheth-
er they control all or a part of local governments), as well as their com-
position and the rules that apply to them. Secondly, it also leads to the 
assessment of the content of controls that they have set up: the control 
of accounts, of financial management, and of the follow-up to the recom-
mendations given by the RAI.
2.  The Scope of RAI External Audits
Some RAIs carry out audits of the financial management and accounts 
of all local and regional entities, while others only perform audits of some 
local governments.
2.1.  The RAI Audit of all Local and Regional Entities 
Within its Scope
Article 171.2 of 1997 Polish Constitution establishes that RAIs are the au-
dit bodies of the local authorities’ activities in financial matters. The Act 
of 7 October 1992 created regional audit chambers that may control all 
countries, is largely obsolete but EURORAI periodically refreshes its theme sheets (www.
EURORAI.org): they are written by financial magistrates of the country concerned.
2 On this distinction, see Revue internationale de droit comparé, 4(51), 747-1071 (con-
tributions offered on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the journal).
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the local entities within their scope. They have full autonomy and are not 
subject to any hierarchical subordination (Kosek-Wojnar & Surowka, 2011, 
p. 228; National Audit Office, 2005, p. 203; Bouhadana, 2007, p. 354). 
The president of the Council of Ministers appoints the president and the 
members of the chamber, and they form the college of the chamber. Half of 
the college is composed of members appointed from among the candidates 
whose names are submitted for the positions by the local authorities (Ko-
sek-Wojnar & Surowka, 2011, p. 230). The rest of the candidates put their 
own names forward for the positions, without sponsorship. 
Their independence is guaranteed by their status, because revocation can 
occur only for criminal reasons (ibid). In this respect, doctrinal ambiguity 
remains on the independence of regional chambers. Some authors consid-
er regional chambers to be placed “under the supervision of the Ministry 
of the Interior” (Hoorens, 2008, p. 532), while others insist that they are 
placed “under the management” (Hugues & Wienen, 2015, n. 76), or 
“under the authority of the Supreme Chamber of control of regional audit 
chambers” (id, n. 80). Regarding the Supreme Chamber, it seems that 
there is some confusion between the sixteen RAIs and the SAI’s sixteen 
regional offices provided for in the 1997 Constitution, which can effec-
tively control the legality of government administration bodies’ activity 
(Article 203), but are independent from the regional chambers and have 
no authority over them (Hoorens, 2008, p. 532). Although there is a Na-
tional Council of Regional Audit Chambers – a member of EURORAI 
– it has no supervision powers over the chambers. At best, it serves to 
coordinate, statistically consolidate, and synthesise chamber reports. 
Considering the “supervision” of the Ministry of the Interior, the term is 
inappropriate because, following a change to the Act of October 1992 
(which took place in 2001), the Ministry of the Interior acquired disci-
plinary powers. These can either be used individually, against a member 
of the chamber who has broken the law exercising his or her duties or 
committed an offence (Kosek-Wojnar & Surowka., 2011, p. 230), or col-
lectively, by dissolving the college of the chamber when it breaks the law 
repeatedly (Thinnes, 2015;3 Chouvel, 2015, p. 93; Eurorai, 2009, p. 76). 
However, this “disciplinary” prerogative does not permit the interpreta-
tion that the Polish regional audit chambers are under the “supervision” of 
the Ministry of the Interior, nor is it possible to question their independ-
ence in exercising their duties (Kosek-Wojnar & Surowka, 2011, p. 230).
3 Thinnes, E. (Secretary General of EURORAI until 2015). Correspondence, 4 No-
vember 2015. 
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The Spanish Court of Auditors is responsible for local governments in five 
regions (Estremadura, Murcia, Cantabria, La Rioja, and, since 2015, Cas-
tilla-La Mancha). The twelve other Spanish regions have (since 1984) set 
up their own RAIs (Eurorai a, p. 1; Cools, 2013, n. 4). The regional par-
liament determines their status, number, prerogatives, and competences, 
which explains the wide range of members in each chamber (20–120 (Eu-
rorai a, p. 9)); the appointment method of the governing bodies (majority, 
absolute majority, or qualified majority); and their name (President, Sind-
ico, Sindico Mayor, or Great Counsellor). They are appointed for a period 
of six years (five years in the case of the Canary Islands). The president of 
the regional audit institution is usually appointed by the president of the 
autonomous region (except in Asturias, where he is designated by the re-
gional parliament), usually after being elected by the plenary assembly of 
the regional audit institution (Eurorai a – annexed tables). The staff con-
sists of controllers, control technicians, and auditing assistants (id, p. 10).4
The dualism of Spanish external control led to the creation of a coordinat-
ing committee for the Court of Auditors in 1989. Currently it is qualified 
for local governments in five regions and the RAIs of the other twelve and 
seeks to establish common criteria and control techniques. A conference 
of RAI presidents was created in the same spirit in 2006 (Eurorai a, p. 5; 
Mézard, 2012, p. 138).
Created in 1982, the French regional audit chambers saw their number 
reduced to twenty, following the Act of 13 December 2011 on the distri-
bution of litigation and the reduction of certain court proceedings, and 
the Decree of application of 23 February 2012 (Fermaud, 2013, p. 1614). 
The law (Article L.212.1 of the Code of Financial Judicial Authorities 
(CJF)) limits the number of regional audit chambers (CRCs) to twenty. 
Following the Act of 16 January 2015, regarding the delimitation of re-
gions, some of these regional entities merged and the number of CRCs 
declined further. Three were the object of a merger and a seat transfer 
following the Decree of 30 September 2015, amending the dispositions 
concerning the seat and the scope of regional audit chambers. The 350 
magistrates of the regional audit chambers (Cour des comptes, 2015, p. 
19) are recruited through the National School of Administration, in one 
of three ways: (1) directly, (2) by means of advertising a vacancy, or (3) by 
means of “tout exterieur” (appointment of servants who have not previously 
4 Formerly, harsh judgments might have been listed on the control carried out by 
the RAI in particular because of the politicisation of recruitment (Carassus & Rigal, 1999, 
p. 68).
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worked in public service). They are appointed by decree of the President 
of the Republic. 
The presidents of CRCs are judges in the Court of Auditors, and are ap-
pointed by decree of the President of the Republic on the recommenda-
tion of the First President of the Court of Auditors. The CRC judges are 
assisted by 700 officers – half of whom are verification assistants (ibid), 
today called financial jurisdiction auditors. CRC are competent to carry 
out a financial management review (Article L.211.8 CJF) of all local and 
regional authorities within their respective scope. This review can be con-
ducted following a justified request of the prefect or territorial authority 
(Bertucci & Doyelle, 1996, p. 995) itself (Article L.243.4 CJF). 
The disproportionate number of local authorities (in particular) which 
may be subject to review led the CRC to set up a review framework for 
the greatest local authorities. The CRCs are implicitly “filtered” on the ad-
ministrative clearance thresholds of local entity accounts (Mézard, 2012, 
p. 54): until 2012 this was 3500 inhabitants and current revenues amount-
ing to 750 000 euros. The thresholds were upgraded with the law of 13 
December 2011 to 5,000 inhabitants and current revenues amounting 
to three million euros (encompassing approximately 2500 communities). 
This implicit refocusing of audits led to a de facto abandonment of the 
financial management review of small local authorities. According to in-
formation provided by the Court of Auditors, only 34 municipalities and 
public establishments for municipal cooperation under the administrative 
clearance scheme were the subject of a financial management review in 
2010 (ibid).
2.2.  RAI Audits Limited to Certain Local Governments
With the exception of the scope of the Austrian Court of Auditors (since 
2011), each of the nine Austrian federal states (regions) has created its 
own regional court of auditors for the financial control of the 86 cities 
with a population of over 10 000 inhabitants (Article 127 A-6 of the Con-
stitution) (Cools & Loizidou, 2011, n. 123). The first was created in 1982; 
the last, for the federal capital, in 2014 (Eurorai b, p. 1). A constitutional 
review, in 1999, sanctioned these RAIs a posteriori by providing (Article 
127 c) that each region can create an institution similar to the Court of 
Auditors. A qualified majority in each regional parliament elects the presi-
dents of each of the nine regional courts, for a limited period of time. Their 
status is subject to special regulations (e.g. ineligibility, incompatibility). 
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Despite their attachment to (regional) legislative power, the prerogatives 
of the courts are guaranteed by each regional constitution and their in-
dependence is reflected in particular by the right to freely determine and 
carry out audits (id. p. 2), even if regional governments and parliaments 
are allowed to entrust them with specific audits (id. p. 3). The internal or-
ganisation of each court is exclusively a matter of the court itself (id. p. 4).
Germany also refers the financial control of its local units to the authorities 
of each of the six regions (federal states). All of them have set up a regional 
audit court, sometimes compared to French regional audit chambers (Al-
lemand, 2008, p. 289; Welz, 2003, p. 40; Lövgren, 2012, n. 27), but their 
terms and audit procedures differ. The constitution of each region guarantees 
their existence, their members’ independence, and their main responsibilities 
(Eurorai c, p. 1). The independence of the courts is linked in particular to the 
recognition of magistrate status of their members and the freedom to choose 
the audit, when it will be performed, and by whom. (id. p. 4). 
The RAIs have decision-making collegial bodies, employees in charge 
of audits and the preparation of decisions, and administrative staff. The 
terms of appointment of the president differ from one region to another. 
In most regions the right of proposal rests with the government or head 
of government. In others it rests with the president of the regional parlia-
ment or the council of elders of the regional parliament. Finally, in some 
regions the presidents of the regional courts of audit, and sometimes 
vice presidents, are elected by the parliament by a two-thirds majority. 
The other members of the regional court are appointed by parliamen-
tary vote (Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, North Rhine-Westphalia, 
and Saarland), or after the approval of parliament (Saxony-Anhalt), and 
by the head of government (id. p. 6). In some cases, the president of 
the court recommends candidates – following nationwide call for appli-
cations – after a hearing by the decision-making body of the court, and 
the proposals are accepted by the head of the regional government (ibid). 
The decision-making body of the court is called, depending on the re-
gion, the college (Berlin, Brandenburg, Hamburg, and Saarland), or the 
senate (Hesse, Lower Saxony, and Thuringia). It includes a president, a 
vice president, and other specifically designated members. The number 
of members ranges from four (Bremen) to sixteen (Bavaria). The term of 
office of the president and the vice president is 12 years (Bavaria, Hes-
se, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schle-
swig-Holstein, and Thuringia), and they are not eligible for re-election 
(ibid). Collegiality is reserved for important cases; for the others, it is a 
small college with two or three members (ibid). 
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The Land courts of audit are divided into divisions or audit areas, headed 
by members of the decision-making body. The first court’s scope is to 
exercise external financial control of the region, but some courts may also 
be in charge of the control of municipalities, and/or Kreise. Thus, control 
of municipalities is entrusted to the court (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, and in 
the city-states of Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg), or the president of the 
court (Hesse, Thuringia) (id. 2). In some cases, the regional court of audit 
only controls some sub-regional local governments: large cities of over 
25,000 inhabitants (Saxony-Anhalt), or Kreise and cities of over 20,000 
inhabitants (Schleswig-Holstein) (Mézard, 2012, p. 136).
With the exception of European funds, whose use, according to the act of 
2001 on the separation of powers of local authorities, is subject to audit 
by the Court of Auditors, Dutch local finances are subject to external con-
trol (acts of 1992 on municipalities and provinces). The local authorities 
have a choice between creating a regional audit chamber – which several 
of them may share – and setting up another modality of control (Liouville 
& Torres-Pereira, 2014, p. 82). This has been possible for the municipal-
ities since 2006 and for the provinces since 2005 (Luppi, 2007, p. 340; 
National Audit Office, p. 195). 
Given the choice between creating an independent regional audit cham-
ber and creating a control committee of accounts, composed of municipal 
councillors (or not), more than 80 percent of municipalities have chosen 
the latter (Mézard, 2012, p. 147). Beginning in 1997, the first independ-
ent audit institutions emerged in Rotterdam, followed by Amsterdam, 
Utrecht, and the Hague (Eurorai d, p. 1; Van Haaren-Dresens, 2001, p. 
21). Currently, there are thirty regional audit chambers. With regard to 
the provinces, 11 have agreed to create four interregional audit chambers, 
while one province has set up its own audit chamber (Eurorai d, p. 3). 
These RAIs, created by the local government in question, are independ-
ent entities. The number of chamber members is determined by the local 
authority/authorities. The members and the president are appointed by 
local assembly for a term of six years (subject to renewal) and they are 
subject to special rules of incompatibility and ineligibility; they can only 
be dismissed for criminal reasons (Mézard, 2012, p. 147; Eurorai d, p. 2). 
The RAI freely chooses each entity it controls but a provincial or munici-
pal council may request a check or a specific investigation be carried out 
(Mézard, 2012, p. 147; Eurorai d, p. 5).
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3.  The Content of RAIs’ External Control
In the European Union, financial management and account management 
are two constituent elements of external control. As is the case in member 
states that use other audit instruments, member states that use RAIs pro-
mote one or both of these elements. This ranges from exclusivity in favour 
of one of these elements to a gradient of intensity for the other. As to fol-
lowing up on these controls, the recommendations given by RAIs may be 
merely indicative or they may have a mandatory character, implying that 
their implementation calls for a follow-up.
3.1.  The Audit of Accounts and Financial Management
Audit bodies have defined the quality standards of control at the inter-
national level. The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institu-
tions (INTOSAI) and its European subdivision (EUROSAI) have adopt-
ed the ISSAI standards regarding audits, procedures, and methods (Pleins 
feux sur les ISSAI, 2013, p. 26; OCDE, 2005, p. 77).5 These implement 
the ISA standards (200, 210, 220, and 230) and the ISQC quality stand-
ard developed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). 
The European Organization of Regional Audit Institutions (EURORAI) 
also promotes the use of ISQC and ISSAI standards by its members and 
ethical standards for auditors prepared by the Council of International 
Standards of Accounting Ethics (IESBA) (Eurorai, 2012).
In the Netherlands, accountants control and certify the financial state-
ments of the local authorities, and regional or communal audit institutions 
may, paradoxically, deal with the accounting aspects of local management 
(Mézard, 2012, pp .131, 138; Eurorai d, p. 1; Chouvel, 2016b, p. 25). In 
the four major cities, the director of the municipal bureau of verification, 
as an accountant, certifies financial statements, even if these towns also 
appoint a private accountant (Eurorai d, p. 1). 
The financial courts of the Netherlands place an emphasis on perfor-
mance audits (Van Montfort & Van Twist, 2006, p. 165). The audit 
chambers, regional or communal, or the committees, assess the quality of 
5 Standards are available in public finance standards, audits of financial statements, 
performance audits, and compliance audits. These standards inspire and structure the in-
stitutions’ control practices; see, for example, Cour des comptes, chambres régionales des 
comptes. (2014). Recueil des normes professionnelles. p. 74.
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management, specifically in the light of the rule known as the “three Es”: 
economy (obtaining a higher income at a lower cost), efficiency (corre-
spondence between the objectives and the actual results), and effective-
ness (proportionality between the results and the means implemented). 
The chambers (or control committees) also check the regularity of the 
different aspects of local government financial management and assess 
the relevance of certain public policies (Mézard, 2012, p. 147; Eurorai d, 
p. 4; Van Haaren-Dresens, p. 198). A study by the Ministry of the Interior 
noted that the chambers and audit committees had conducted audits on 
subsidy policies, tenders and outsourcing benefits, hiring consultants in 
management, project management, urban development, and privatisation 
(Eurorai d, p. 4). Apart from these major control areas freely chosen by 
the organisations, a provincial or municipal council may request a specific 
audit (id. 5). The Dutch Association of Chambers of Accounts and Audit 
Committees (NVRR), founded in 2003, publishes a manual on the au-
diting of local authorities and develops recommendations on this subject 
based on the rules of “good practice” (id. 6).
Some states grant primacy to accounting regularity compared to the qual-
itative aspects of financial management; however, this does not mean that 
the latter is never taken into account. Thus, Spain may formally practice 
both control of the regularity of accounts and of sound financial man-
agement, under the rule of triple E, which appears in Article 31 of the 
Constitution as a requirement of sound management. While in the five 
regions without a RAI the Court of Auditors assumes this function, in the 
other twelve regions a regional chamber is responsible for the audit. As 
EURORAI points out, audits based on the triple E are a new and major 
challenge (Eurorai a, p. 4). The Spanish public sector in particular was 
subjected to audits of regularity and legality, even though the law that 
created the Court of Auditors in 1982 highlights the importance of the 
criteria of efficiency and economy that must be integrated into the con-
trols. The regulatory and procedural arsenal on financial control may be 
well defined and standardised (evaluation of the existing internal control 
system, development of ad hoc programs for each of the areas of audit), 
but this is not the case with triple E audits, whose standards and proce-
dures have neither been consolidated nor sufficiently well accepted by a 
majority of professionals (ibid). Barriers of all kinds (id. p. 7) hamper per-
formance audits, although there is broad agreement to develop controls 
in this direction (ibid).
Financial management auditing of local government in France (a country 
with more than 500,000 local representatives) is specific in that it does 
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not possess the nature of court power, but is still badly seen by local poli-
ticians. If the evolution of the judicial functions of regional and territorial 
chambers of accounts (CRC) is mainly due to the pressure of Europe-
an law, the evolution of administrative functions, and particularly finan-
cial management review, is directly inspired by purely political concerns 
sometimes reflecting the contradictions that may exist between national 
needs and local aspirations.
Originally, the law of 2 March 1982 (the Defferre Law), stipulated that 
the CRC must ensure a good use of funds and provided for the possibility 
of presenting observations on their management to the local authorities 
within their scope. However, in a few years its implementation by the 
CRC succeeded in creating a strong resentment in local officials because 
they did not understand, nor did they want to admit, that doubts could 
be cast upon their management, even if only the local executive was the 
recipient of these observations. Some senators even proposed that this 
function of the CRC be eliminated (the proposed law was tabled in 1987 
by P. Séramy). The first intervention was the law of 5 January 1988 (the 
Galland Law), which was a compromise between the warlike intentions 
of elected local officials and the national need for sound management. 
The Galland Law substituted the concept of regular use of funds with 
the concept of good use. That formulation eliminated the possibility of 
the CRC objecting to the choices made by deliberative assemblies and 
local officials. However, it did not prevent the CRC from evaluating their 
management to ensure regular use of public funds. This would have con-
stituted a significant restriction of the actions of the chamber, even if the 
law had added that the CRC may examine the financial management of 
local authorities and their public institutions. The “control” of financial 
management, even if the word did not appear in the Defferre Law, be-
came financial management review in 1988 (Limouzin-Lamothe, 1988, p. 
427; Eurorai e, p. 12; Revue française de finances publiques, 2004).
The law of 6 February 1992 (the Joxe Law) then granted permission to 
the prefect (upon a reasoned request), as well as to the territorial au-
thority, the right to request a financial management review by the CRC 
(Bertucci & Doyelle, p. 995). The last step is to define the scope of this 
management review, a process conducted according to the law of 21 De-
cember 2001, relative to the regional chamber of audit and the Court of 
Auditors. It provides for the review to focus on the regularity of manage-
ment actions, on the economy of the means used, and the evaluation of 
the results achieved against the targets set by the deliberative assembly. 
Again, this definition of management review is the result of a compro-
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mise (Lamarque & Miller, 2002, p. 741) that seems to comply with the 
International Standard on Auditing, but nevertheless allows the CRCs 
to continue their work in innovative directions. In 2001 the review of the 
regularity of financial management became a review of financial manage-
ment performance. 
Although this is not jurisdictional procedure, the legislator has continued 
to increase the procedural safeguards surrounding management review 
for the benefit of the auditees and third parties; these procedural safe-
guards could have been improved, as pointed out by an incisive Senate 
report (Oudin, 1998) on management review. Some recommendations in 
this report were included in the law of 21 December 2001. By providing 
an experimentation platform (open for a period of 3-5 years), for the cer-
tification of the accounts of local authorities and their groupings, Article 
110 of the law of 7 April 2015 included the local public sector in the cer-
tification procedure which applied to all the accounts of the public sphere 
and ended the debate on the usefulness of such a procedure without sol-
ving the numerous technical issues associated with it (Doreau-Tranquard, 
2012, p. 115; Chouvel, 2016b, p. 28).
The German regional courts of audit, for their part, conduct external au-
dits under the Organic Law on Budget Principles, the budget regulations 
of each region, and the internal regulations of each court that codify con-
trol practices (Eurorai c, p. 4). The courts provide an audit of accounting 
regularity, covering both accuracy and legal compliance (id. p. 3). They 
also provide control of management in terms of “economicity”, which is 
the German version of the triple E: it includes the principle of maximisa-
tion, i.e., verifying that the best result has been obtained with the funds 
used, and the principle of minimisation, i.e., verifying that the result has 
been achieved with minimal funds (ibid). Under these control activities, 
the courts have an advisory function whose importance should not be un-
derestimated. The “non-independent board” is created in connection with 
the control procedure and aims to conduct an informal exchange of the 
views and proposals of the controller and the auditee. The “independent 
counsel” is disconnected from any control procedure, but is the result of 
an explicit request made by a regional parliament, a regional government, 
or a minister (id. p. 2). However, this additional function of the courts 
is left to their discretion, as they are not legally required to exercise an 
advisory role (id. p. 3).
The Austrian regional courts of audit have similar powers to their German 
counterparts (financial regularity, sincerity of the accounts, and “econo-
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micity” control), and perform them ex-post (Eurorai b, pp. 3-4). However, 
some of these courts have permanent power of control over large-scale 
construction projects called “project progress control” (id. p. 2). Still, this 
management control does not transgress the ex-post character of external 
control, because it is set up to follow the successive stages of the project, 
which allows for carrying out rectifications before the work is completed, 
if necessary (id. p. 4). Finally, the regional governments may entrust the 
courts with a special mission of control by order of a regional parliament, 
a finance committee, or the parliamentary minority (id. p. 3).
The state occupies a special place in the external control of local gov-
ernments in the European Union: the bodies responsible for this, as 
elsewhere, control accounting regularity and good use of public funds, 
but also implement powers of sanction by using self-referral to exercise 
a preventive legality control of budget acts for which they have the pow-
er of cancellation. The Polish regional audit chambers exercise the same 
external control functions as other bodies responsible for this in the Eu-
ropean Union, but they also exercise “preventive” control of legality over 
the budgetary and financial acts of all local governments. The power to 
invalidate irregular acts imposes on the regional audit chambers a hybrid 
status of financial jurisdiction and administrative court. Their decisions 
can also be appealed to administrative courts, which is unique in Europe.
Sound financial management is audited in ways inspired by the interna-
tional standards adopted and diffused by the Supreme Chamber of Con-
trol, for example, in its journal Public Audit (National Audit Office, p. 
208). When it comes to control functions delegated by the state, stand-
ards of reliability, efficiency, and opportunity (Doric & Smith, 2002, n. 
45) are applied. The mission that observers see as fundamental is that of 
financial management auditing (Kosek-Wojnar & Surowka, 2011, p. 230). 
It includes the procedure of the budget vote, the budget itself, the dis-
charge, the commitments that impact the debt, grants, local taxes (ibid) 
and resolutions and orders of the authorities (deliberations and decisions) 
in the financial area (id. p 231). Since the new law on public finances 
came into force in 2010 it has also included the resolutions regarding the 
multi-year budget forecast (id. p. 234), budget projects, the ability to fi-
nance the deficit and the debt, and the ability to repay a loan (id. p. 233).
Finally, there are not many aspects of budgetary and financial manage-
ment of the local government that escape the chamber’s surveillance and 
this a priori legality control of acts is accompanied by the power of cancel-
lation of the contested act (id. p. 232; Chmielarz-Grochal, Sulkowski & 
Marczewska, 2014, p. 17). Before this invalidation, the chamber informs 
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the local government of the illegality and encourages it to modify the act 
accordingly (COE, 1999, p. 97; Doric & Smith, 2002, n. 45). The act is 
cancelled in default of modifications, but this procedure is reserved only 
for serious illegalities, because in case of minor irregularities the cham-
ber only suggests the necessary changes (Doric & Smith, 2002, n. 45). 
Reviews of the acts’ legality are assigned to a panel of three members. In 
2008, for example, the regional audit chambers examined nearly 150 000 
resolutions and orders of the authorities – more than 97 percent of these 
acts were considered legal (Kosek-Wojnar & Surowka, 2011, p. 232). In 
addition to the cancellation of acts, regional chambers can also suspend 
the execution of a budget act: this decision may be appealed to the ad-
ministrative court (COE, 1999, p. 97). Cancellation decisions are them-
selves subject to appeal before the administrative judge (Kosek-Wojnar & 
Surowka, 2011, p. 229). This preventive control of budget acts is a legality 
control, which includes sound financial management, integrity, and ef-
fectiveness of spending practices (Hugues & Wienen, n. 81). Occasional-
ly, regional audit chambers may conduct a joint audit with the Supreme 
Chamber of Control. According to Article 203 of the Constitution, it is 
possible to control the activity of local government bodies from the per-
spective of legality, sound management, and probity under a cooperation 
agreement concluded for this purpose in February 2002 (National Audit 
Office, 2005, p. 206; Hoorens, 2008, p. 532; Eurorai, 2009, p. 76).
3.2.  Follow-up to the Recommendations
Checking the accuracy of accounts has long been considered sufficient, 
but the legitimate curiosity of parliaments and taxpayers goes beyond 
this, and has extended to the financial management audit, i.e., the proper 
use of funds (Magnet, 1991, p. 11). The control bodies have adapted to 
these new missions, sometimes in advance, and had to handle, with the 
legislator, the consequences of spending a considerable amount of admin-
istrative energy that their controls generate. In this regard, EU member 
states are divided into two types: one type believes that the audit report 
must have an effect and that the recommendations are mandatory in na-
ture, while the other considers their effectiveness to be ensured by the 
publication of the report.
The publication of the report prepared by the French regional audit cham-
bers (Lamarque & Miller, 2001, p. 549) has required a balance approach 
for a long time. Since 1990 the public nature of the final observations 
may have raised questions because of the provisional observations, which 
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remained confidential but were submitted to a growing number of stake-
holders (officers and leaders out of office, as well as third parties). In order 
to avoid media exploitation of the work of the chambers during elections, 
the law of 21 December 2001 introduced a period of neutrality – which 
corresponded to the practice of the different CRCs – establishing that the 
final observations report shall not be published or communicated to its 
recipients or third parties in the three months preceding the elections of 
the local government concerned (Article L.243.5 of the CJF). Originally 
reserved for the executive of the local government concerned, the obser-
vations made by the French regional audit chambers have been placed 
under a confidentiality regime by the Galland Act of 1988. The regime 
was lifted two years later by the law of 15 January 1990. This text provides 
that the final observations letter (today referred to as a report) produced 
by the chamber shall be communicated by the local executive to its delib-
erative assembly at its next meeting (Article L.243.5 of the CJF), whereby 
the observations will lose their confidentiality. Article 107 of the law of 7 
August 2015 provides that the final observations report, addressed to the 
president of a public institution for intermunicipal cooperation, is also to 
be sent to the mayors of the municipalities that are members of this public 
institution immediately after the presentation made to its assembly (Arti-
cle L.243.7.II CJF). The same Article 107 established for the first time a 
follow-up procedure for the definitive observations report produced by a 
regional audit chamber for the financial management review of a local au-
thority. Until then, it had been purely theoretical, and the local executives 
concerned were not forced to take any measures, or indicate the measures 
taken or planned in response to the chamber’s observations and recom-
mendations. As is noted in the impact study of the law, the new text aligns 
these follow-up rules with those in force for the Court of Auditors: the re-
cipients of its observations are required to provide the elements on which 
the presentation of the follow-up will be established. With these rules – 
adopted with no opposition or discussion – France joined the mainstream 
in Europe, which requires local authorities to report the measures taken 
in response to a financial management audit.
The law of 7 August 2015 led France to a change of perspective because 
the final observations letters/reports had not previously been subject to 
any kind of follow-up. The new article L.243.7 of the CJF now obliges the 
executive of a local authority or the president of a public institution for 
intermunicipal cooperation with its own fiscal resources, to submit, within 
a year, a report on the measures taken in response to the observations of 
the regional audit chamber. This report is communicated to the chamber, 
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which provides a synthesis of the reports received, and the president of 
the chamber presents the synthesis during the territorial conference of 
public action – a consultative body created by the law of 27 January 2014. 
It brings together, under the chair of the president of the regional council, 
representatives of different local governments and the presidents or repre-
sentatives of public institutions for intermunicipal cooperation with their 
own fiscal resources. Each regional audit chamber shall also send this 
synthesis to the Court of Auditors for the presentation of the follow-up to 
the observations included in the annual report.
In Austria, the recipients of the reports prepared by regional audit cham-
bers are the government and the parliament of the region, or the municipal 
council, but an annual report summarising all audits is also submitted to the 
government and the parliament of the region (Eurorai b, p. 5). Once the 
conclusions of the audit have been sent, the mayor must notify the super-
visory authority within the following three months (Article 127 A-6 of the 
Constitution) of the measures taken (Gamper & Pernthaler, 2003, p. 58). 
The regional courts, however, do not have the power of injunction and the 
improvement proposals or savings recommendations have to be implement-
ed by the authorities of the concerned local governments (Eurorai c, p. 3).
Besides the occasional inspection reports sent to interested parties, the 
German regional courts of audit synthesise all the results of their controls 
in an annual report (sometimes called Remarks from the Court of Audit) (id. 
p. 5). This is not a report of accountability, nor an activity report, and oc-
cupies an important place in the discharge procedure for the financial man-
agement of the regional government. The annual report of each German 
regional court of audit, addressed to the government and the parliament of 
each region, is then published in the form of a parliamentary publication 
and is presented by the court at a press conference (ibid) to make it accessi-
ble to the public. However, the individual results of the control procedures 
are not made public: the court alone decides on the opportunity to commu-
nicate the results to other bodies – which may have the effect of indirectly 
ensuring publicity. Only those conclusions of fundamental importance are 
communicated to the minister of finance of the region (ibid). The court can-
not follow any instructions because only the controlled entities can act on 
the consequences of the control results (ibid). Nevertheless, when control 
concerns municipalities, whatever the supervisory authority, it must ensure 
that the issues raised in the observations are followed up on (ibid).
In the Netherlands, the chambers must, as provided by the Municipality 
Act of 1982, send their findings and recommendations to the services 
controlled (Eurorai d, p. 5). The chambers have the power to submit their 
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audit reports to the various municipal councils (id. p. 2). All reports – 
communal or provincial – must be submitted to local assemblies and their 
executive (id. p. 6). The chambers and the control committees publish 
their reports, and these are usually accompanied by a press release (ibid).
In Spain, the final audit report is presented by the chamber in thirteen re-
gions to the respective local governments and to the regional parliaments, 
with a copy sent to the Court of Auditors (Eurorai a, p. 6). The controlled 
local governments decide whether to publish the report (id. p. 7). Reports 
on the accounts of the autonomous communities are published in full in 
the official journal of the community, except in Catalonia, where only 
publication of the regional chamber findings is mandatory (id. p. 8). Some 
chambers include reports in an annual report sent to the regional parlia-
ment (Castille and Leon, and Madrid), while others send their reports 
in succession to the various parliaments. The chambers all subsequently 
publish their reports on their websites (see the publication schedule in 
the annexed table) (ibid). In the four regions without regional chambers, 
and where the Court of Auditors has jurisdiction, the publication of its 
local government audits is ensured by their inclusion in the annual report 
addressed to the parliament (National Audit Office, 2005, pp. 246–247).
Polish regional audit chambers carry out preventive legal controls of budget 
and financial acts of the local governments, which is why they send multiple 
reports, opinions, decisions, warnings, and summons to local deliberative 
assemblies (Kosek-Wojnar & Surowka, 2011, p. 230). Audit reports are also 
sent to the prime minister and bodies that assist local authorities in case 
errors are found (COE, 1999, p. 97). The work of the regional audit cham-
bers are made public indirectly, by means of an annual activity report of the 
regional audit chambers and a report on the budget implementation by the 
units of local authorities made by the National Council of Regional Audit 
(Kosek-Wojnar & Surowka, 2011, p. 237).
4.  Conclusion
The RAI control model is rare in Europe. The diversity of structures, the 
way they are organised, and their procedures defy classification. At most, 
we can see that the member states that have established RAIs are those 
with the largest number of local authorities, because these six countries 
together account for about two-thirds of the total number of local govern-
ments in the European Union. The RAI is attached to a regional territory 
and has more detailed knowledge of this territory than an ISC. The other 
states with a significant number of municipalities (Romania, Italy, and 
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the Czech Republic) have opted for control by means of a supreme audit 
institution, which has regional structures.6
More specifically, some RAIs and states have particularly original and un-
usual rules in the area of financial control of European local governments. 
For example, the RAI of Styria is open to a referral for an audit request rea-
soned and signed by two percent of regional electorate (law of 7 December 
1989 on the control initiative), which is relatively unique in Europe and 
creates a direct democratic link with this audit body. Moreover, in Austria 
and Poland, RAIs can control a priori, concomitantly, and a posteriori – like 
with the Portuguese Court of Auditors, for example – contracts of some 
importance signed by the local authorities, and their implementation.
Finally, regarding the texts governing the RAI, the RAIs of the six mem-
ber states concerned meet the conditions described in the principles ap-
proved in 2016 by the Steering Committee of the EURORAI. These are, 
for example, an appropriate legal framework (principle 5), independence 
of chairpersons and members (principle 6), no interference by the legisla-
tive or executive authorities (principle 7), appropriate resources (principle 
11), financial autonomy (principle 12), prevention of conflicts of interest 
(principle 14), and other principles. These “guidelines” were presented, 
discussed, and illustrated at a seminar organised by Lower Austria’s Court 
of Auditors in St Pölten on 29 April 2016. As for supreme audit institu-
tions, the institutional independence of regional audit institutions is re-
flected in the legal framework and in budgetary autonomy; the personal 
independence of their members has to be sought in the modalities of their 
appointment and dismissal, as well as in the applicable statutory provi-
sions. On the other hand, the situation is more complex in the states that 
make use of private companies or public bodies (national or decentral-
ised), in order to ensure external control of local and regional authorities.
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EXTERNAL FINANCIAL AUDITING OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS BY REGIONAL AUDIT INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
Summary
In the European Union, external financial auditing of local and regional gov-
ernment entities is performed according to four distinct methods, but only six 
states (Germany, France, Spain, Austria, Poland, and the Netherlands) resort 
to using the regional audit institution (RAI), whatever its name may be (regional 
court/chamber of accounts). The independence of the RAI is legally enshrined, 
by the constitution and/or by the law, in the states concerned and is reinforced by 
significant financial autonomy. Their statutes place their members at a distance 
from any mix of political or professional genres in the exercise of their functions: 
this all corresponds in general with the recommendations of EURORAI. The 
creation of RAIs was an answer to several cumulative needs. Some states did not 
have an external audit body for local governments (and the multiple agencies 
that depend on them), such as the Netherlands or Poland. The federal (Germa-
ny, Austria) or quasi-federal (Spain) structures of other states led to the creation 
of decentralised audit bodies. Finally, the number of local governments was, in 
certain cases, too high be controlled by a supreme audit institution (SAI), which 
also provided national control missions (France). This last factor was undoubt-
edly decisive, because it may be observed that these six states together account 
for about two-thirds of the total number of local governments in the European 
Union. These RAIs carry out their function for local governments either as a 
whole, or selectively, which results in the control of the accounting regularity and 
of management performance, achieved according to the procedural methods that 
present certain analogies. The follow-up to the resulting recommendations is of 
unequal scope, depending on each state. Some consider the recommendations 
to be of an imperative character, while in others their effect is considered to be 
achieved by the mere publication of the control report.
Keywords: external audit, financial auditing, accounts, public finance, local 
government, RAI, financial management
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VANJSKA FINANCIJSKA REVIZIJA JEDINICA LOKALNE I 
REGIONALNE SAMOUPRAVE KOJU PROVODE REGIONALNE 
REVIZIJSKE INSTITUCIJE U DRŽAVAMA EUROPSKE UNIJE 
Sažetak
U Europskoj uniji vanjska financijska revizija jedinica lokalne i regionalne sa-
mouprave provodi se primjenom četiriju različitih metoda, no samo šest država 
članica (Njemačka, Francuska, Španjolska, Austrija, Poljska i Nizozemska) 
koriste regionalne revizijske institucije (RAI-e). One se još mogu nazivati i regi-
onalnim računovodstvenim sudovima ili komorama. Neovisnost RAI-a zajam-
čena je ustavom ili zakonom država koje ih koriste, a neovisnosti u prilog ide i 
znatan stupanj njihove financijske autonomije. Statuti RAI-a propisuje zabra-
nu bilo kakvog političkog ili profesionalnog utjecaja na članove RAI-a, što je i u 
skladu sa EURORAI preporukama. RAI-i su nastali kao odgovor na različite 
potrebe. U nekim zemljama, kao što su Nizozemska ili Poljska, nisu postojala 
vanjska revizijska tijela koja bi se bavila lokalnim samoupravim jedinicama 
(i brojnim agencijama koje one osnivaju). S druge strane, ustrojstvo nekih ze-
malja, federalno (u Njemačkoj i Austriji) ili kvazi-federalno (u Španjolskoj), 
rezultiralo je uspostavom decentraliziranih revizijskih tijela. Napokon, u nekim 
slučajevima, kao npr. u Francuskoj, radilo se o tome da vrhovna revizijska in-
stitucija (SAI) nije mogla nadzirati preveliki broj jedinica lokalne samouprave. 
Ovaj posljednji faktor se nesumnjivo pokazao odlučujućim prilikom uspostave 
RAI-a u navedenim zemaljma, budući da one zajedno obuhvaćaju dvije trećine 
jedinica lokalnih samouprava u Europske unije. RAI-i mogu provoditi reviziju 
jedinica lokalne samouprave u cjelini ili samo nekih njezinih tijela ili institucija. 
RAI-e nadziru pravilnost računovodstvenog postupanja kao i rezultata poslo-
vanja, a prilikom provedbe nadzora koriste niz proceduralnih metoda među 
kojima postoji sličnost između zemalja. Po provedenom nadzoru, RAI-e izdaju 
preporuke, no aktivnosti koje se poduzimaju radi praćenja izvršavanja prepo-
ruka nisu ujednačene između zemalja. Neke zemlje izdane preporuke smatraju 
obvezujućima, dok se kod drugih smatra da one svoj učinak postižu samim 
javnim objavljivanjem.
Ključne riječi: vanjska revizija, financijska revizija, računovodstvo, javne fi-
nancije, lokalna samouprava, RAI, financijsko upravljanje
